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Abstract. In his excellent paper, Na¯ga¯rjuna as anti-realist, Siderits
showed that it makes sense to perform a connection between the po-
sition of the Buddhist Na¯ga¯rjuna and contemporary anti realist theses
such as Dummett’s one. The point of this talk is to argue that this con-
nection is an important one to perform for one’s correct understanding
of what Na¯ga¯rjuna is doing when he criticizes the contemporary Indian
theories of knowledge and assertion, first section, but as soon as the the-
ories of argumentation are involved, this connection can be implemented
in a better way from an other anti realist perspective, namely the one of
Dialogical logic (Erlangen school), in which the signification is given in
terms of rules in a language game.
The philosophical issues are to hold an interpretation of the type of
assertion performed by Na¯ga¯rjuna. We here aim at making a rational
reconstruction of his chief claim ‘I do not assert any proposition’ in which
a proposition is considered as the set of its strategies of justification.
As for the last section, the point will be to apply these analyses to Bud-
dhist practice. We will in this section consider the conventional character
of human activities as the fact that any speech act is performed within
a dialogue under ad-hoc restrictions; and the question of one’s progress
in the soteriological path to liberation will be asked1.
1 Na¯ga¯rjuna on theories of knowledge
1.1 The dependent origination : an all-inclusive version of causation
Na¯ga¯rjuna, one of the most influential thinkers of Buddhism and the founder
of the ma¯dhyamika school, the school of the Way of the Middle, developed
in the second century AC a criticism of the contemporary Indian theories of
knowledge and assertion. The key-concept of these criticisms is the concept of
‘dependent origination’ (prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da) as taught in the su¯tras of the
prajn˜a¯-pa¯ramita¯, the ‘Perfection of Wisdom’. The dependent origination is a
technical Buddhist expression involving particular definitions of the notions of
causality and contingency: there is not a chain but a web of causation such that
the existence of a thing is contingent upon the existence of every other thing.
1 I would like to keenly thanks all members of the referee, which have helped me a lot
throughout this reconstruction of Na¯ga¯rjuna’s thought.
For example, the existence of a tree is dependent upon the existence of a seed
and upon the existence of wind, water, ground, and so on. In turn, the existence
of the seed itself is also dependent upon the existence of the tree from which it
comes and upon the existence of wind, water, ground, and so on. The list of the
causes and conditions of existence of a thing can never be ended. Now, this tree
is, in Na¯ga¯rjuna’s perspective, nothing but the set of its conditions of existence.
Thinking that there is an independent tree is thinking that there is a closed set
of such conditions of existence, which is misleading. The Buddhists tell us that
we have to think of reality as a generalized web of such dependencies and that
the task of enunciating them is a never-ending task.
1.2 The epistemic level
The question therefore arises concerning everyday life practice: how is it that
we do talk about the world and that we do have knowledge that governs our
practice? The Buddhist answer amounts to saying that there is a decision from
the knowing subject to carve out in the generalized web of interdependencies
that she will call ‘an object’. Therefore, she is always engaged within the choices
she has made when she perceived. From this, her own conceptions are always
engaged when she knows a fact of the world. In other words, the facts of the
world and the knowledge I have of them can in no way be independent from
each other. As Jay Garfield2 puts it:
To say that an object lacks essence, the Madhyamika philosopher will
explain, is to say, as the Tibetans like to put it, that it does not exist
”from its own side” [...] that its existence depends upon us as well.
Now, one of the great consequences of the fact that my knowledge depends
on the context in which it has been gained is that there is no such context as
the universal one, in which the proposition at stake could have been firmly es-
tablished. In other words, every proposition can be questionable from a different
perspective. This is the main observation that is pointed out in the chief work of
Na¯ga¯rjuna, namely, the Mu¯la-madhyamaka-ka¯rika, the ‘Fundamental Stances of
the Middle Way’. In this work, he shows for each universally alleged knowledge
statement of an other Indian school of thought that it is questionable.
We immediately understand that the statement saying that ‘every proposition
can be disputable from an other perspective’ is itself disputable. This is essentially
in order to avoid this type of criticisms that Na¯ga¯rjuna wrote the Vigraha-
vya¯vartan¯ı, the ‘Treatise to Prevent from Vain Discussions’. But in these lines,
he supplies with an answer to these criticisms far much interesting than the
classical problem of self reference. We here aim at a rational reconstruction of
the strategy of Na¯ga¯rjuna in this work.
2 In [4], p.220.
2 Na¯ga¯rjuna on theories of assertion
In the Vigraha-vya¯vartan¯ı, Na¯ga¯rjuna does not implement his ideas directly with
regard to the process of acquisition of knowledge, but to the process of assertion
and negation of a given thesis within a debate. The link between the two could
easily be reformulated in the following way: the justification of an assertion in a
philosophical debate is but the demonstration of the fact that what is asserted
is rationally guaranteed, that is to say that it is the subject of knowledge.
2.1 The art of making no assertion
A new approach to knowledge statements First of all, let us examine again
the dependency between my beliefs and the facts of the world. In order to have
a better idea of what is at stake, let us focus on current theories that deal with
similar conceptions, notably the anti realist position. Anti realist philosophers
claim that, since there is no transcendent state of affairs, being epistemically
guaranteed can not amount to being in adequacy with reality. The same impor-
tant consequence has to be drawn from the Na¯ga¯rjunian conception, according
to which I can not know something that exists independently of my knowledge
of it. From this, Na¯ga¯rjuna is committed to the position that it is possible to
give an account for the process of acquisition of knowledge that is different from
the account in terms of adequacy with reality. And this precisely because we can
never be sure of what is reality per se.
At a second stage, anti realist philosophers developed a new conception of
knowledge according to which being epistemically guaranteed amounts to being
justifiable. Here, the justification of knowledge is a conventional matter, it is a
coherentist and not a foundationalist process and allows for a plurality of justified
types of knowledge. In terms of assertion, this means that ‘ϕ is true’ means ‘ϕ
is justifiable’. And the semantic anti realist position is leading to the recognition
of a plurality of ways in which an assertion can be said to be ‘justifiable’.
Our claim is that Na¯ga¯rjuna speaks in terms of justification too. Notably
because Na¯ga¯rjuna is in line with the Indian tradition of argumentation:
– First of all, the structure itself of the Vigraha-vya¯vartan¯ı is argumentative.
More precisely, no position is put forward without its set of justifications.
What is more, these justifications consist in the answer to all potential at-
tacks of a conceivable opponent.
– Moreover, within the classical Indian tradition, something is admitted as
knowledge if and only if it has been gained by means of a prama¯n. a, a ‘crite-
rion for justified knowledge’. As argued, successfully in my view, by Siderits
in [9] and by Waldo in [11], Na¯ga¯rjuna does not in the Vigraha-vya¯vartan¯ı
call into question the possibility but the uniqueness of the prama¯n. a account.
Actually, Na¯ga¯rjuna is himself using prama¯n. a. What is interesting for our
subject is that this theory of prama¯n. a has its roots within a theory of con-
sensus. More precisely, the Naiya¯yikas, who are the main interlocutors of
Na¯ga¯rjuna in the Vigraha-vya¯vartan¯ı, consider that the right process to dis-
criminate between beliefs that are knowledge and beliefs that are not is a
consensus, whose task is to find an equilibrium between the beliefs one has
about the world and successful practice. And, as I said, Na¯ga¯rjuna is happy
with it, he is not denying this approach but he is indicating that it is in
nature coherentist, on-coming from the decision of a scientific community,
and not foundational, on-coming from the structure of the world itself.
Therefore, the kind of semantic anti realism we are advocating here is more in
line with Brandom’s inferentialism, as outlined in [2], than in line with Dum-
mett’s approach, advocated in [3]. The main difference between the two is that
Brandom performs what could be called a ‘social turn’. According to Brandom,
the nature of assertion consists in the fact that in asserting, the speaker achieves
the following institutional effect: she undertakes the responsibility of justify-
ing her assertion. Following the lines of Brandom3, the important point here is
therefore to analyse assertion as commitment. We claim that what Na¯ga¯rjuna
is saying, though different in nature, is governed by the same rules that govern
Brandom’s inferentialism, namely:
– The fact that the signification of a proposition cannot be specified indepen-
dently from the subject who enunciates this proposition ; and a switch from a
referentialist semantics to a semantics in terms of conditions of assertability.
This is a consequence of Na¯ga¯rjuna’s position that nothing is independent.
– A conception of the act of assertion in which ‘to assert ϕ’ means ‘to commit
oneself to give justifications for ϕ’. Here, the notion of justification becomes
basic. This reading follows from the fact that no position in the Vigraha-
vya¯vartan¯ı is advocated without the set of all the strategies one could need
to defend it. In other words, any position advocated in this work is present
along with the set of all the strategies needed to make the point in a given
discussion. Notice here that strategies are not the same depending on the
identity of the opponent at stake4.
The dialogical approach In order to advocate this, we are going to make use
of a formalism, namely Dialogical Logic, whose format is very likely to express
Na¯ga¯rjuna’s approach. This formalism is very straightforward, first because of
its dialogical presentation ; and secondly for its anti realist motivations. Other
conclusive connections will be stressed in the course of this section. The approach
of dialogical logic developped by Rahman, as shown by [8], is a modified version
of the constructivist approach of Lorenz and Lorenzen (Erlangen school), [7]
enhanced with a pragmatist orientation. It deals with the features of semantic
anti realism just mentioned and measures the signification of a sentence by means
of its conditions of assertability, that is to say by means of the set of all the
3 In [2], Chapter 6: ‘Objectivity and the Normative Fine structure of Rationality’
4 For example, reductio ad absurdum arguments are used in the Mu¯la-madhyamaka-
ka¯rika against an Abhidharmika opponent, while petitio principii arguments are the
tool in the Vigraha-vya¯vartan¯ı, where they are adressed to a Naiya¯yika opponent.
possible strategies when discussing the proposition expressed by the sentence in
question.
More precisely, what is at stake in this approach by means of a formal proof
is to establish the validity of a sentence (which content is a proposition). Non-
formally speaking, a formal proof is a game between two players, respectively
called the Proponent and the Opponent, that ends when all the justifications of
the sentence at issue are given or when no further move is allowed. The mark
of the validity of a sentence is the presence of a winning strategy. There is a
winning strategy when the Proponent wins the dialogue whatever the choices of
the Opponent may be.
We can already see that a very important feature of this dialogical approach of
logic is the asymmetry between the Proponent and the Opponent. Here, only the
Proponent is performing genuine assertions. This is due to the ‘formal restriction
rule’ according to which only the Opponent can assert atomic formulas or, to
put it in a different way, can assert elementary justifications. It is important to
keep in mind here that atomic formulas are the parts of a formula that is not
analysable through logical tools. We therefore are unable to prove them logically.
Yet, asserting them by presupposing them would be but justifying a proposition
within a particular case and, once more, we here deal with validity and the
dialogues are formal dialogues. The Dialogical proposal is therefore to allow the
use of such an elementary justification if and only if the Opponent has conceded
it.
Now, as the Opponent’s role is to defeat the Proponent’s assertion, he will
perform as few concessions as he can and will introduce the minimal set of atomic
formulas. Testing the formal justification of a proposition within this type of
dialogue is thus like convincing the most acute interlocutor. Hence, when the
Proponent wins, the set of plays of the Opponent represent but the construction
of the minimal set of presuppositions needed in order to prove the validity of the
sentence (in order to assert that a given proposition holds in all situations); they
do not represent the moves of a ‘real’ player. Let us remark here that the builder
of the minimal set of conditions of assertability is itself by definition asserting
without restriction at all. This is why he is therefore not to be considered as to
be performing assertions.
What we will recall of this Dialogical approach for our purpose are the fol-
lowing features:
– A formal proof is put in the form of a dialogue, that is to say of a linguistic
interaction. This is part of the pragmatist sensitivity.
– By means of the moves of the pseudo-player Opponent in a dialogical play,
asserting a proposition amounts to asserting only the set of its justifications,
that is to say, the set of its conditions of assertability. This is a consequence
of the constructivist anti realist approach.
From this, propositions are the forms of an achieved dialogue5. Hence, as-
serting a proposition amounts to asserting the entire dialogue that was used
to assert it. As Keiff [6] put it:
The fundamental idea of Dialogical semantics could be enunciated through
the following principle:
”The signification of an assertion which has its type entirely given by the
form of the dialogue in which it has been asserted by a speaker, provides,
for a critical interlocutor, with all the necessary justifications to succeed in
his assertion”
Interpreting Na¯ga¯rjuna These features of the Dialogical approach lead us to
conceive it as a really adapted tool for one who wants to discuss Na¯ga¯rjuna’s
position on theories of assertion. Indeed, if a proposition is a dialogue brought to
fruition, then any dialogue whose initial thesis is defective does not contain
any proposition in that very sense6 because:
To assert is to commit oneself to provide with justifications
And in a formal game, this means to provide with justifications in any situation.
In the Indian context, we deal with such a formal game when we speak about the
process of the justification of an inference because an inference is a tool to get
assured knowledge, that is to say unquestionable knowledge. This universality
seems to be exactly what Na¯ga¯rjuna refutes when he says:
mdFymEp vcnAm^ þtaF(ysmumatra (pà(vAn^ En,-vBAv\ ।
mad¯ıyam-api vacanam prat¯ıtya-samutpannatva¯n nih. svabha¯vam.
[VV, v.22]
(Na¯ga¯rjuna’s self commentary on the verse 22.)
My speech, because it is dependent on conditions, is contextual (literally ‘is
without a self-sufficient nature’)7.
Na¯ga¯rjuna is saying that the validity of any speech act does always depend
on the chosen focus within which I assert. And from this, to prevent oneself from
an illusory universal assertion amounts to be aware of the fact that such a formal
dialogue can never be finished and, therefore, that there are no proposition in
that very sense. And this provides us with a means to understand the famous:
5 This conception is shared by linear logic and ludic logic as developed by Girard and
associates (see for example [5]). The study of these frameworks could also be very
fruitful to our understanding of Na¯ga¯rjuna’s position.
6 Notice here that the Sanskrit expression for ‘thesis’ is ‘siddha-anta’, ‘what is estab-
lished at the end’.
7 In this talk, each quotation of Na¯ga¯rjuna is from my own translation, taken from
my Master Dissertation, Na¯ga¯rjuna et le pluralisme logique, at the University of
Lille in September 2004. I had for this translation mainly worked with the edition
of E.H.Johnston and A.Kunst, published in 1978 with the excellent translation of
Professor Bhattacharya, see [1].
yEd kAcn þEtaâA -yAm tata eq m Bvoq, ।
nAE-ta c mm þEtaâA ॥
yadi ka¯cana pratijn˜a¯ sya¯n me tata es.a me bhaved dos.ah. |
na¯sti ca mama pratijn˜a¯ ||
[VV, v.29]
If I had asserted any proposition, this fault (consisting in the paradox of
self-reference) would be mine,
but I do not assert any proposition.
We are therefore able to say that when Na¯ga¯rjuna says that he does not make
any assertion, he is not saying that he says nothing, he is very likely to say that
he will not commit himself in the formal process of justification of his positions.
The reasons of this refusal are that such a formal proof with a universal claim
is vain. A formal proof can in no way be complete. Na¯ga¯rjuna’s sentence ‘I do
not assert any proposition’ can therefore be understood this way ‘No sentence
is ‘valid’ in the sense of ‘universal’ ’. We can speak together and understand
what a given language conveys but we have to keep in mind that this is the
conventional level, that at every moment things can be discussed and that the
one who wants to reach an indisputable claim whatsoever will be defeated.
At the verse 24, Na¯ga¯rjuna is performing a terminological switch from pratijn˜a
(proposition) to va¯da. Traditionally, the term va¯da refers to the philosophical
debate or to a claim in a discussion. Now, he have shown that in these lines,
Na¯ga¯rjuna is performing a speech act that is not fully justifiable. We therefore
propose to render this act by the term ‘position’ in the sense that it is something
that depends on hypothesis, something that is still disputable.
We are going to follow the same line in our understanding of Na¯ga¯rjuna’s
treatment of negation.
2.2 The art of making no negation
A constructivist negation... If the negation of a proposition is the assertion
of the negated proposition, then this problem also affects the act of negating:
the negation of a proposition is always questionable. The problem here is that
Na¯ga¯rjuna can not firmly establish his criticisms if they are in the negative form.
In verses 61 to 63, Na¯ga¯rjuna explains that negating a thing involves the
propositional attitude he wants to get rid of because the act of negating is but
the act of asserting the negated thesis. Hence, he has to say:
þEtaqDyAEm nAhAm^ ।
þEtaqDyAsF(yEDly eq (vyA Eyta ॥
pratis.edhaya¯mi na¯ham. |
pratis.edhaya¯si ity adhilaya es¯a tvaya¯ kriyate ||
[VV, v.63]
I do not negate anything,
You foolishly calumniate me when you say ‘you negate’.
Now the question remains: what sort of speech act is he performing then?
a/ âApyta vAgsEdEta taà þEtahEta ॥
atra jn˜a¯payate va¯g asad iti tan na pratihanti ||
[VV, v.64]
Here, the speech makes it known as false, it does not negate.
In other words, the attack of a given thesis does not lead to the assertion of
the negated thesis, but leads to show that the assertion of the thesis is faulty.
What Na¯ga¯rjuna performs here is an other type of speech act which does not
imply a propositional attitude as the assertion does. We will call this act a
denegation. Characterizing this act is the goal of the following section.
...and the operator of denegation In the Dialogical approach of logic as
introduced above, Keiff developed in [6] a negation which encodes a very similar
process.
First of all, what is at stake is to understand a type of negative speech act as
the indication of the failure of an act of assertion. As such, this is a constructivist-
like negation according to which ‘non A’ is to be read ‘there is no correct proof of
A’ and not ‘there is a correct proof of non A’. What is more, unhappy with the
standard way to encode this reading in a formal proof, that is to say unhappy
with the interpretation of ‘non A’ as ‘A entails a contradiction’, Keiff makes a
step that will help us here8. More precisely, he develops another reading in which
‘non A’ behaves like an operator of denegation and has to be read ‘if you
assert A, I will show you that your formal proof of A is not sufficient’.
Now, it is evident that this sticks to what is at stake in Na¯ga¯rjuna’s approach
on theory of assertion when he points out the fact that the signification of an as-
sertion is never unchallenging data. Here, it is worth mentioning that Na¯ga¯rjuna
makes use of reductio ad absurdum arguments, but never uses them in order
to establish the opposed thesis. He always uses them in order to show that the
attacked thesis is no a justified thesis and that it does not hold. Moreover he
does not, in the Mu¯la-madhyamaka-ka¯rika, develop a whole meta theory about
the fact that every thesis can be questionable, but he takes one by one every
metaphysical thesis in order to show how they can each be disputed.
8 His motivations were different,since he aimed at introducing a notion of relevance
that could not be encoded within this standard interpretation.
3 Na¯ga¯rjuna and Buddhist practice
3.1 Dialogical Conclusions and the everyday life strategies
To summarize, Na¯ga¯rjuna is saying that we are performing only unfulfilled as-
sertions (respectively negations). Speech acts are never assertions (negations) in
the strict sense but positions (denegations). The reason for it is that to assert
a proposition in a philosophical discussion is to commit oneself to give the jus-
tifications for this proposition in such a manner that it will be unquestionable
whoever the interlocutor may be while we have to be aware of the fact that
the signification and validity of any sentence have their roots in a net of condi-
tions that cannot be entirely enumerated: an assertion (negation) is always still
dependent on a hypothesis that is not justified.
Hence, my claim is to say that Na¯ga¯rjuna does not call into question the fact
that a set of statements expressing epistemically guaranteed beliefs can possibly
be considered as a set of statements expressing ‘knowledge’ (which would have
been a skeptical position). What he does question is rather the origin of this
guarantee. According to him, the epistemic guarantee is not the agreement be-
tween my set of beliefs and reality, but the agreement between my set of beliefs
and the successful practice of a community (which is more like an anti realist
position in line with Brandom’s inferentialism).
In this reading, the Dialogical approach is useful because (in addition to
its dialogical frame directly able to express Na¯ga¯rjuna’s position) it considers
a content of knowledge as the practice of an epistemic agent. This is the idea
captured by the fact that ‘a proposition is the form of an achieved dialogue’
or, in other words, by the fact that ‘a proposition is the set of its conditions
of assertability by a speaker’. Moreover, the Dialogical approach provides with
technical tools to express this conception of a proposition, and to express the
fact that if the agreement is to be between my set of beliefs and the successful
practice of a community, then there can be several distinct types of agreement.
And this is what we are going to develop in this section.
First of all, from the Dialogical perspective, Na¯ga¯rjuna’s claim amounts to the
following claim: ‘Everything is falsifiable’. Which is not the same claim as
‘everything is false’. It is important to keep in mind the asymmetry between the
two players of a linguistic game as captured by a Dialogical game. More precisely,
the position of Na¯ga¯rjuna could be reformulated in this frame by saying that the
Proponent can never have a winning strategy, whether she asserts or denies
something. Only the Opponent can have a winning strategy and he always has.
There is no achieved dialogue, no more is there a proposition because there is no
form of an achieved proof. More formally, let us consider a consequence relation
|= (extension to a syntactic derivability relation is straightforward). To say that
|= is trivial usually amounts to say that for any well formed formula ϕ and ψ,
ϕ |= ψ9. But one could also define a dual concept of triviality, namely that for
any ϕ and ψ, ϕ 6|= ψ.
9 Equivalently, if ϕ is T (‘top’), this means that any ψ is valid.
If one is to take seriously Na¯ga¯rjuna’s claim that no assertion is possible,
then one cannot escape the conclusion that the logic he advocates is trivial in
the second sense, i.e. nothing can successfully be defended against all possible
criticisms, not even logical truths for there is not any.
While the whole logic does not seem to allow for a lot of fruitful developments,
a fragment of it, namely the fragment in which the Opponent choses to play
within a sub class of models (a focus), will do. More precisely, we here deal with
a sub system in which there are validities. One can even play within classical
rules10. The only restriction here is that there are no ultimate validity, that is
to say, there are no validity against an Opponent that plays the best possible
moves. In other words, the Proponent can never have a winning strategy against
an Opponent who plays the best possible moves. But he can perfectly win against
a not acute or comprehensive one. This is why we do learn and communicate
in everyday life (vyavaha¯ra). The Proponent can win, but he will manage to do
so only against an Opponent that grants him concessions. These restrictions are
ad-hoc (conventional) and they do define a certain type of Opponent. Na¯ga¯rjuna
does not develop this, but the Jainas will do in their naya-va¯da, their ‘theory on
perspectives’, in which each set of restrictions of the Opponent will represent a
given Indian school of thought.
3.2 The art of making indications
We have been until now explaining Na¯ga¯rjuna’s position, but we have not yet
come to the defense he performed against the ones who argue that the position
that everything is disputable is itself disputable. In order to have another ap-
proach to this criticism, I would like to come back to the asymmetry between
the Proponent and the Opponent in the Dialogical approach. The Proponent is
the only one to have commitments when asserting a proposition. Everything
‘asserted’ by the Opponent, is ‘asserted’ at the meta theoretical level. More
precisely, the status of his pseudo-assertions and pseudo-commitments is noth-
ing else that the indication of what the Proponent needs to justify what he is
asserting.
Nevertheless, Na¯ga¯rjuna is ‘protected’ from asserting just as long as he is not
trying to defend as a thesis the positions he has in his Vigraha-vya¯vartan¯ı be-
cause it is evident that the paradox is present whenever what we are performing
at the meta theoretical level is played within the propositional level. Na¯ga¯rjuna’s
‘I do not assert any proposition’ is precisely the recognition of the fact that if
he had put his meta theoretical positions within a discussion for getting justifi-
cations, they would have been challenged. Hence, he is not playing them within
a philosophical disputation, but he is taking the only means he has, namely
practice. Through this practice, he can show for any thesis in a discussion, that
this thesis cannot successfully be defended against all possible criticisms, which
is the task of the Mu¯la-madhyamaka-ka¯rika. But this is important to keep in
10 This is a counterargument to the thesis according to which Na¯ga¯rjuna holds para
consistent thesis.
mind that doing so Na¯ga¯rjuna is playing at the ‘object language level’ in a very
poor sense: he only takes the pseudo-interlocutor role of the Opponent and, in
each situation, shows how to falsify a sentence (which is certainly not the same
thing as trying to establish a negative sentence!). I said ‘in a very poor sense’
because this role is but the indication of a metalanguage position. The same way,
in his Vigraha-vya¯vartan¯ı, Na¯ga¯rjuna stays at the level of the metalanguage to
indicate that he will not go at the level of the language object for any (positive
or negative) sentence11.
3.3 Buddhist soteriology
The question is therefore the following: how powerful is the act of Na¯ga¯rjuna
when he is pseudo-asserting? To answer this, it is useful to keep in mind the
deep thesis of John Woods, in [12], according to which a ‘fallacy’ is not a fault
of reasoning. This is rather a reasoning such that there is no best reasoning for
men, that is for rational agents with limited capacities.
This thesis takes on a new meaning in this Indian theory. Here, the speech
act fails to be an assertion. It is but a position in a debate and holding such a
position is not considered as a fault of reasoning: it is the right and fruitful way
to conduct a reasoning. Speech acts are useful even if they are not propositions.
More precisely, language is useful for one to posit himself or somebody else within
another web of conditions, within another perspective from which she will be able
to notice and signify other things. Language as a mere conventional activity is
useful to posit the interlocutor within a perspective in which she will be able to
experience useful things for her emancipation. In this argument, Na¯ga¯rjuna uses
the parable of an artificial man:
EnEmtakAyA\ yTA E-/yA\ -/Fym^ i(y^ asíAhm^ ।
EnEmtak, þEtahyAt^a k-yEcd^ ev\ Bvd^ etat^a ॥
nirmitaka¯ya¯m. yatha¯ striya¯m. str¯ıyam ity a-sad-gra¯ham |
nirmitakah. pratihanya¯t kasyacid evam. bhaved etat ||
[VV, v.27]
(Na¯ga¯rjuna’s self commentary of the verse 27.)
<What I am doing with my speech> is as if an artificial man would prevent
from the wrong perception of a man <who would believed> ‘this is a woman’
where there is an artificial woman
Now, the fault occurring at the semantic level is present at the practical
level too : if the assured character of an assertion is something debatable in the
object language and if the metalanguage can be put and played within the object
language, then it is the target of the same objections and we can not know with
11 Here we can think about Tarski’s work in which he explains that the object language
is strictly included within the metalanguage precisely because of such situations, [10].
certitude this metatheoretical fact, for example, that we are progressing in our
knowledge.
Our proposal here is to say that this is precisely why we have to practice.
More precisely, we can not assert in a propositional way that we are progressing,
and it is important not to do so, but we can experience it.
That is why Na¯ga¯rjuna do not go further in its theory of assertion. Following
the example of the Buddha, remaining silent on metaphysical questions is a
crucial step for him to undergo12. In conclusion, our claim is that even if it is
not developed, the technical and philosophical consequences of such a position
are:
– A theory of assertion as act of commitment ; and a theory of the forces of
the assertion (assertion versus position, and negation versus denegation).
– To redefine the role attributed to logic. More precisely, it seems that what
is at stake is the transition:
• From a vision of inference (inductive and deductive) as what legitimates
the fact that a proposition is considered as an assured knowledge
• To a vision in which argumentation has the pragmatic function to vali-
date some inferences in relation to a given perspective.
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